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I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, an interested director was barred from participating in corporate decisions in which he had an interest, and therefore “disinterested” directors became desirable. This concept of the disinterested
director developed into the model of an “independent director” and was
advocated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) and court decisions as a general ideal in a variety of situations.
The SEC’s policy preference for independent directors was embodied in
the Investment Company Act of 19401 and highlighted in some early
cases.2 Although the term “independent director” is often used rather
loosely, it should be understood to mean a director without any general
conflict of interest with the corporation. An interested director, by contrast, is a director who has a conflicting interest in a particular transaction.
The SEC’s view of the need for independent directors should be
understood in the context of Adolph Berle’s theory of the 1930s. It posits
that shareholders had abdicated control of public corporations to corporate managers, and fiduciary duties needed to be imposed upon corporate
boards to compensate for this loss of shareholder control. 3 Berle’s writings laid the foundation for shareholder primacy as the theory of the
*
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1. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1, 80a-2(19), 80a-10 (2012).
2. See infra text accompanying note 10.
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firm—a theory embraced by the SEC, which viewed itself as a surrogate
for investors. Pursuant to this theory, a corporation is managed for the
benefit of its shareholders.
The SEC has generally succeeded in imposing its corporate governance views in the wake of scandals. Following the sensitive payments
enforcement program of the 1970s, the SEC embarked on an activist corporate governance reform program. During the merger and acquisition
frenzy of the 1980s, the SEC used the Williams Act 4 to foster the view
that the market for corporate control constrained incompetent managers.
After the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000 and the financial reporting scandals that ensued, the SEC was able to incorporate its views
on independent directors into the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley).5 Following the financial crisis of 2008, the SEC further
enforced its views on independent directors in the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank).6
The composition and behavior of securities markets and investors
has changed drastically since the SEC was established in 1934. Yet, the
SEC has persisted in its path-dependent view that independent directors,
ever more stringently defined, should dominate the boards of public
companies. What is the function and rationale for such directors? If it is
to assure that corporations comply with laws and regulations imposed on
public corporations, then they become just another (probably ineffectual)
gatekeeper. If it is to weaken the power of the CEO, it should be noted
that there is some doubt whether independent directors can or should do
so. If it is to be responsive to the needs and views of shareholders, which
shareholders of an increasingly diverse body should be served? In recent
years, and particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, academics and others have been questioning both the shareholder primacy
model of the firm and the independent director model of board governance.
The independent director ideal has not been embraced all over the
world. Neither has shareholder primacy. In some countries, a director
representing the controlling shareholder is considered to be not independent because one of the goals of corporate governance is the protection of minority shareholders. Also, where the government is a major

4. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (modifying Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13,
14 and codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78m–n (2006)).
5. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
§ 7201, 18 U.S.C. § 7201, and 28 U.S.C. § 7201).
6. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 42
U.S.C.).
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shareholder, the independent director model is problematic. After the
2008 financial crisis, the conflicts between shareholders and creditors
became more apparent. Should the independent director be independent
of major shareholders as well as managers in order to preserve and increase the value of the firm?
I have never been entirely comfortable with the SEC’s view that the
best public company boards are those composed of directors whose only
compensation for sitting on a board comes from directors’ fees and who
have no potentially conflicting business interests (past or present) with
the company. The debates about independent directors were heated while
I was a commissioner of the SEC from 1977 to 1980. Afterwards I
served as an independent director of a large public company for twenty
years, as a public director of the New York Stock Exchange from 1983 to
1989, and on the Advisory Committee for the American Law Institute
Corporate Governance Project. 7 Many of my views are colored by these
experiences. In particular, when I was a director, I found the insights of
inside directors invaluable in decision making. Since 2008, my doubts
about the independent director model have increased. This Article will
explore those doubts and suggest that director expertise may be more
important than director independence. Further, directors should have an
obligation to the long-term viability of a corporation. Such an obligation
would infringe upon the shareholder primacy theory of the firm, especially to the extent that this model encapsulates running the company for
short-term economic gain. Furthermore, in an institutionalized marketplace, retail shareholders may need to be protected against institutional
investors.8
Part II of this Article outlines the evolution of the independent director model as championed by the SEC. Part III discusses criticisms of
the independent director model. Part IV discusses shareholder primacy
and sets forth alternatives to the shareholder primacy theory of the firm.
Part V discuses corporate governance models outside the United States.
Part VI concludes.

7. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
8. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional
Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1 (2004).
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II. TWENTIETH-CENTURY SEC VIEWS ON INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
A. Early SEC Views
In re Franchard Corp.9 is generally cited as the first move by the
SEC into the establishment of corporate governance standards. The
Commission held that the “integrity of management—its willingness to
place its duty to public shareholders over personal interests”—is a material disclosure item.10 The SEC staff had argued in this administrative
stop-order proceeding that “by identifying members of the board of directors, [the registrant] impliedly represented that they would provide
oversight and direction to the registrant’s officers.”11 The Commission
rejected this theory on the ground that it would “stretch disclosure beyond the limitations contemplated by the statutory scheme.”12 The
Commission believed it was not equipped to evaluate the entire conduct
of a board in the context of the whole business operations of a company.
Over time, this limited view of the SEC’s statutory authority and
expertise gave way to a more activist approach to corporate governance.
In its reports on the financial collapse of Penn Central, the SEC cited
lapses by the railroad’s board of directors: “They failed to perceive the
complexities of the company’s financial operations, problems, or the critical nature of the company’s financial situation [and] permitted management to operate without any effective review or control” because they
“were uninformed of important developments and activities.”13
The SEC staff’s view of the need for corporate governance reform
has generally been aired in the context of corporate scandals. In the early
1970s, a number of influential voices cried out for federal corporate chartering in order to curtail the deleterious influence of giant corporations. 14
The SEC then embarked on an activist corporate governance reform program in the context of a general post-Watergate hysteria—an effort to
blame business for a prevailing climate of corruption, a stagflation economy, and a long-bear market. The immediate spur to this program was
the questionable foreign payments cases, where approximately 400 pub9. 42 S.E.C 163, Securities Act Release No. 33-4710, 1964 WL 67454 (July 31, 1964).
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. at 9.
13. RALPH FERRARA & MARK GOLDFUS, EVERYTHING YOU EVER WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT
THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 28 (1979).
14. See, e.g., RALPH L. NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1st ed. 1976); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974); Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 BUS. LAW. 1125
(1976).
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lic companies consented to injunctions to cease paying commercial
bribes to foreign government agents in order to obtain business. 15 Some
of these consents included the restructuring of a company’s corporate
board.
In response to the sensitive payments cases, Congress passed the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 16 which criminalized the payment of
bribes to foreign officials.17 It also required companies registered with
the SEC to maintain accurate books and records, and to develop a system
of internal accounting controls. 18 This was the first statute in which the
SEC was given direct power to regulate the internal affairs of public corporations. Ironically, the statute was passed almost simultaneously with a
Supreme Court decision prohibiting the use of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) from
being used to regulate directorial breaches of fiduciary duty. 19 According
to the Court, such an extension of the securities laws would overlap and
interfere with state corporation law: “Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of
the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities.”20
Therefore, the SEC obtained a new power to impact corporate governance with regard to internal controls at the same time the Court expressed
the view that Congress did not intend to create a federal corporation law
by passing the federal securities laws.
Nevertheless, in a general atmosphere of criticism of business leaders, the corporate governance debate turned to questions of board composition and director independence. The SEC embarked on a program to
influence board structure with a new chairman who believed in independent board directors. In April 1977, the SEC announced that it would
hold public hearings concerning shareholder communications, shareholder participation in the corporate electoral process, and corporate
governance in general. 21 After these hearings, the SEC proposed rules to
encourage boards to become independent of management by restructuring to include only persons not affiliated with the corporation.
15. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 94TH CONG., REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC REPORT ON
QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS].
16. Pub. L. No. 95-213 (1977) (codified in scattered sections 15 U.S.C. 78).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (2006).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
19. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
20. Id. at 478–79.
21. Reexamination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process, and Corporate Governance Generally, 42 Fed. Reg. 2390102 (May 11, 1977).
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In the view of then-SEC Chairman Harold Williams, a majority of
board members should be independent, or at the very least a board’s
nominating, compensation, and audit committees should be composed of
independent directors.22 Williams also recommended that the CEO
should not serve as chairman of the board. It is interesting that Chairman
Williams was not a fan of shareholder primacy. He criticized shareholders who purchased stock to hold for a short period of time to sell at a
profit, stating: “They do not perceive themselves as owners of the company, but rather as investors—or speculators—in its income stream and
the stock market assessment of its securities.”23 Although he believed
that a board of independent directors could be a countervailing force to
CEO power—and thus necessary to make corporations more accountable—his concept of corporate accountability went far beyond that owed
to shareholders:
As a society, we depend on private enterprise to serve as the instrument through which to accomplish a wide variety of goals—full
employment, equal economic opportunity, environmental protection, energy independence, and others. When viewed in light of
these social implications, corporations must be seen, as to a degree,
more than purely private institutions, and corporate profits as not
entirely an end in themselves, but also as one of the resources which
corporations require in order to discharge their responsibilities.24

The view that corporations are quasi-public institutions that should
be held accountable to a number of constituencies has a long history, but
the independent director movement did not usher in an era of corporate
accountability to employees, customers, or the public. Rather, the model
of the board of independent directors accompanied a shift from a manager-centric corporate governance system to a shareholder-centric system.25
Disclosure regulation was the only mechanism the SEC had for effecting boardroom reform during the SEC corporate governance program
of the 1970s. Accordingly, the SEC proposed to require all corporations
subject to the SEC’s proxy rules to label their directors as “independent”

22. Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Sixth Annual
Securities Regulation Institute, Corporate Accountability—One Year Later (Jan. 18, 1979), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1979/011879williams.pdf.
23. Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Fifth Annual
Securities Regulation Institute, Corporate Accountability 12 (Jan. 18, 1978), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1978/011878williams.pdf.
24. Id. at 8.
25. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1907, 1910 (2013).
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or “affiliated.”26 These rules aroused a storm of protest and the SEC’s
final rules required only a brief description of “significant economic and
personal relationships . . . between the director and the issuer.”27 Although the SEC has generally managed to utilize disclosure requirements
as a prophylactic device to achieve some modification of corporate conduct, the agency chafed at being unable to directly regulate corporate
behavior. It viewed the absence of any SEC authority to regulate corporate board structure as a policy error to be corrected.
During the takeover battles of the 1980s, pressure for independent
directors arose in court battles where incumbent boards attempted to
maintain company independence or fight against corporate raiders by
finding a white knight.28 The active merger and acquisition market of this
decade led to the demise of many established industrial companies. In
administering the Williams Act, the SEC generally sided with bidders, or
the interests of Wall Street, in opposition to target companies, or the interests of Main Street. 29 In retrospect, the takeovers of this period were
part of the deindustrialization of the United States and may not have been
entirely positive. Although the U.S. economy arguably became more efficient and competitive, the manufacturing of goods and many types of
jobs were outsourced or exported. Finance overtook industry and income
inequality markedly increased. Some of these issues were debated during
the November 2012 elections with a hindsight view of the financial crisis
of 2008. In my opinion, however, the asset bubble of the early years of
this century, and its bursting in 2008, was the culmination of economic
and financial regulation problems that should have been apparent in the
1980s. The SEC focused on defending the market for corporate control
when perhaps it should have been focusing on the questionable behavior
of financial investors who were dismantling public corporations for
short-term shareholder gain.

26. Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process
and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 14,970, 43 Fed. Reg. 31945,
31947 (July 18, l978).
27. Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process
and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15,385385384, 43 Fed. Reg.
58522, 58523 (Dec. 6, 1978).
28. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
29. The SEC did so by refusing to define the term “tender offer,” see Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
sometimes bringing cases, see SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985),
refusing to close the 10-day window for Schedule 13D filings to allow bidders more time to accumulate stock, adopting Rule 14d-10, and participating in cases as amicus curiae.
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The merger mania of the 1980s was financed to a significant extent
with junk bonds emanating from Drexel Burnham Lambert (Drexel). The
role of that firm in using leverage to take over major industrial companies continues to be controversial, even after Michael Milken, Drexel’s
maestro, went to jail for insider trading. 30 More recently, the spotlight
has focused on Bain Capital, a Drexel client, which engaged in a number
of highly leveraged private equity deals in the 1980s that resulted in the
export of U.S. manufacturing and jobs.
The directors of target companies who attempted to fend off unwelcome hostile takeovers during this period were frequently criticized for
their failure to act independently of management. 31 But with hindsight, it
is possible to inquire whether the financial interests that fueled the takeover boom of the 1980s acted in the public interest or only in the interest
of stock market speculators. The passage of state-other constituency or
stakeholder statutes attempted to ameliorate the strong shareholder primacy underpinnings of the Williams Act, 32 but Delaware did not pass
such a statute and continued to referee battles between bidders and target
companies.
B. Investment Company Governance
For many years, the SEC enjoyed more success in promoting the
idea of independent directors for investment companies than for other
corporations because the securities laws gave the SEC more power to do
so. Investment company corporations are organized under state law, often in the state of Maryland.33 Under the Investment Company Act of
1940, at least 40% of the board must be composed of “independent” or
“disinterested” directors.34 The rationale for this provision was to eliminate conflicts of interest and abuses rampant in the investment trusts of
the 1920s.35 This principle may have originated at the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. (NYSE), which made independent representation on the
boards of investment trusts a requirement for listing in 1931 on the theory that investor “protection could be most readily obtained by independ-

30. See CHARLES R. GEIST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 335–42, 358 (1997).
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
32. E.g., 15 PA. CONSOL. STATS. ANN. §§ 1711, 1715, 1716, 1717, 2502.
33. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
34. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. 80 §§ a-2(a)(19), a-10(a), 2(a)(19) (2006).
35. See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S.3580 Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency Committee, 76-768, Part 1, 76th Cong. 8–9, 32–
47 (1940).
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ent directors under whose scrutiny and friendly criticism [of] contemplated transactions would pass for review.”36
Initially, the directors of an investment company could not be “affiliates” of the investment company, but in 1970 the statute was changed
to the stricter standard that directors must be “disinterested.”37 However,
the SEC did not remain satisfied with this amendment, so it advocated
for further director independence. In 2001, the SEC determined that certain investment companies, those that rely on certain exemptions by rule,
were required to have a majority of their boards be disinterested directors
and have independent legal counsel for the independent directors. 38 This
rule was never challenged.
In 2004, the SEC amended ten widely relied upon exemptive rules
to enhance the effectiveness of independent directors. 39 Funds using these
exemptions were required to have 75% disinterested directors and an
independent chairman. Other provisions with regard to governance included the following: (1) fund directors must perform an evaluation, at
least once annually, of the effectiveness of the board and its committees,
and among other things, decide if they are serving on too many fund
boards; (2) independent directors need to be authorized to hire their own
employees; and (3) funds need to retain the written materials directors
consider in approving an advisory contract. Two Commissioners dissented from the adoption of these rules and the case went to the D.C. Circuit
Court, which held in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC40 that the SEC had
the authority to pass the rule mandating a 75% board of independent directors but did not appropriately consider costs and benefits with regard
to the separation of the CEO and chairman. Therefore, the court vacated
the independent chairman rule. Nevertheless, most funds now have at
least a majority and usually 75% independent directors. Some have independent chairmen, but many have a lead director instead.41
The SEC is happy to experiment with its corporate governance ideas in the context of investment company regulation, but investment companies are merely a pool of assets without employees or products. The
36. Id. at 36.
37. See Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1416 (1970).
38. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No.
43786, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001).
39. Investment Company Governance, Inv. Co. Act Rel. No. 26520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46378 (Aug.
2, 2004).
40. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The case was remanded to
the SEC and a revised rule was also stricken. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 896
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
41. Overview of Fund Governance Practices 1994–2012, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST.,
www.ici.org/pdf/pub_13_fund_governance.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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role of the board is to manage the relationships between the company and
its service providers, particularly its advisers and underwriters. In many
respects, the board serves a compliance function and is not involved with
strategy or the development of new products or services. Despite the
SEC’s belief that the organization of an investment company board is a
good model for all corporations, investment companies are highly regulated financial vehicles and their use as a model for other corporate
boards is questionable.
C. Sarbanes–Oxley Reforms
After the bursting of the technology stock market bubble of the
1990s and the implosion of Enron and WorldCom,42 Congress passed
Sarbanes–Oxley in 200243 in an effort to reform the corporate governance of public companies under the direction and supervision of the SEC.
In June 2002, immediately prior to the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley, a
committee of the NYSE, at the urging of the SEC, issued a report recommending changes to the NYSE listing standards.44 This report had a
variety of recommendations for changes in NYSE listing standards that
went beyond Sarbanes–Oxley, including: (i) requiring listed companies
to have a majority of independent directors, with a stringent definition of
the term “independent”; (ii) a provision for regularly scheduled executive
sessions of boards chaired by a lead director or independent chairman;
(iii) requiring listed companies to have nominating and compensation
committees composed entirely of independent directors; and (iv) requiring shareholder votes on equity-compensation plans. These recommendations were then transmitted to the NYSE board of directors, and several
of them were filed with the SEC as proposed new listing standards.
Sarbanes–Oxley gave the SEC the authority it had long wanted to
restructure aspects of corporate governance, but it did so primarily by
authorizing the SEC to direct self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to
change their listing rules to meet certain standards. 45 The law mandated
that the SEC put into place requirements pertaining to the independence
and functioning of public company boards—audit committee members,
in particular—by ordering the NYSE and other SROs to make such re42. See Kathleen Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes–Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (2003).
43. See sources cited supra note 5.
44. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE (2002) [hereinafter NYSE CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_govreport.pdf. This project was requested by the Chairman of the SEC.
45. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l (2002).
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quirements part of their listing standards. In addition to regulating the
manner in which audit committees are structured and function in a way
that was not previously done, Sarbanes–Oxley made these regulations a
matter of federal, rather than state, law.
Because Sarbanes–Oxley greatly enlarged the scope of the Exchange Act as to specific matters of corporate governance, the SEC acquired greater freedom to utilize SRO listing standards to accomplish
corporate governance reform. In implementing Sarbanes–Oxley, the SEC
has made ample use of this new authority, raising the interesting question
of where the line between federal and state law should be drawn with
respect to a corporation’s internal affairs.
In addition to proposals that relate to audit committees, the NYSE
proposed that non-management directors must meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions, and that nominating and compensation committees be composed entirely of independent directors. 46 Nasdaq filed similar listing proposals with the SEC.47 The final SRO listing rules, as approved by the SEC for implementing Sarbanes–Oxley, include provisions for independent board members for key committees; mandate executive sessions of non-management directors; define committee independence for audit and nominating committee members; define audit
committee financial experts; set forth specific size requirements and obligations of the audit committee; and require companies to have codes of
business conduct and ethics.48 Continuing education for directors is also
suggested.49
46. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 47672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19051 (Apr. 11, 2003).
47. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48745, 81 SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003).
48. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes (SR-NYSE-2002-33 and SRNASD-2002-141) and Amendments No. 1 Thereto; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes (SRNASD-2002-77, SR-NASD-2002-80, SR-NASD-2002-138 and SR-NASD-2002-139) and Amendments No. 1 to SR-NASD-2002-80 and SR-NASD-2002-139; and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment Nos. 2 and 3 to SR-NYSE-2002-33, Amendment Nos. 2,
3, 4 and 5 to SR-NASD-2002-141, Amendment Nos. 2 and 3 to SR-NASD-2002-80, Amendment
Nos. 1, 2, and 3 to SR-NASD-2002-138, and Amendment No. 2 to SR-NASD-2002-139, Relating to
Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64154 (Nov. 12, 2003).
49. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Am. No. 1
thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate Governance, File No. SRNYSE-2002-33, Exchange Act Release No. 47672, at *12 (Apr. 11, 2003) (director orientation and
continuing education must be described in corporate governance guidelines); Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the American
Stock Exchange LLC Relating to Enhanced Corporate Governance Requirements Applicable to
Listed Companies, File No. SR-Amex-2003-65, Exchange Act Release No. 48706, at *10 (Oct. 27,
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D. Dodd–Frank Reforms
The restructured public company board, as mandated by Sarbanes–
Oxley, did little to prevent the financial meltdown of 2008. It has been
argued that, leading up to the crisis, independent directors did not sufficiently focus on or understand risk and risk management.50 However,
rather than questioning the soundness of the independent director model
in the wake of widespread corporate failures, the SEC pushed forward
with its ideological preference for independent directors and so added
provisions to this effect into Dodd–Frank.51
Dodd–Frank further tightened the independence requirements for
compensation committees, requiring that each member of compensation
committees be independent and clarifying the standards by which committee members are determined to be independent.52 Additionally, Dodd–
Frank requires compensation committees to consider certain enumerated
factors in selecting compensation consultants, legal counsel, or other advisors to the committee, such as “the policies and procedures of the person that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other
adviser that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest.”53
Some Dodd–Frank reforms reached beyond independent director
requirements and fingered executive compensation as a cause of the financial crisis. Dodd–Frank attempted to empower shareholders to curb
risky behavior by managers by giving shareholders an advisory vote on
executive compensation and golden parachutes. 54 A claw-back provision
for executive compensation based on erroneous financial statements was
also inserted for public companies. 55 With regard to financial institutions,
Dodd–Frank required appropriate financial regulators to impose regulations on such institutions to disclose the structures of all incentive-based
compensation arrangements that could lead to material financial loss or

2003) (listed companies urged to develop and implement continuing education programs for all
directors).
50. Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible Risk Management in Banking: The Corporate
Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 121, 128–34 (2011); Andrew Ellul & Vijay Yerramilli,
Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies (AXA Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 1, Discussion Paper No. 646, 2010); Bernadette A. Minton, Jérôme P.A.
Taillard & Rohan Williamson, Do Independence and Financial Expertise of the Board Matter for
Risk Taking and Performance? (Fisher Coll. of Bus. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2010-03-014,
2011).
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2010).
53. Id. § 78j-3(b)(2)(C).
54. Id. § 78n-1.
55. Id. § 78j-4.
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would be excessive for executive officers, employees, directors, or principle shareholders.56
Dodd–Frank also directed the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board to issue regulations requiring each bank holding company
with consolidated assets of greater than $10 billion, as well as each nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors, to establish a risk committee. 57 The risk committee is responsible for the oversight of enterprise-wide risk management practices of the supervised
company or bank holding company, and it is to include such a number of
independent directors as the Board of Governors determines appropriate.58 Additionally, the risk committees are to include at least one risk
management expert having experience in identifying, assessing, and
managing risk exposures of large, complex firms. 59 This reform thus emphasizes expertise rather than independence.
Misguided ratings for structured products were widely blamed for
the 2008 financial crisis. In response, Dodd–Frank put into place new
requirements for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSROs).60 At least half of the board of an NRSRO must be comprised
of independent directors.61 Further, a portion of the independent directors
must include users of NRSRO ratings.62
In order to be considered independent, a member of the board of an
NRSRO may not, other than as a board member, accept any consulting,
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the NRSRO or be associated
with any affiliated company of the NRSRO.63 Additionally, a board
member must be disqualified from any deliberation involving a specific
rating in which the independent board member has a financial interest in
the outcome of the rating. 64 Finally, the compensation of these independent board members may not be linked to the business performance of the
NRSRO, and the term of office of such a director is limited to five
years.65
Despite affirming the independent director model for compensation
committees, Dodd–Frank sought to address capital market failures that
56. 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a)(1) (2010).
57. Id. § 5362.
58. Id. § 5365(h)(3)(A)–(B).
59. Id. § 5365(h)(3)(C).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2010).
61. Id. § 78o-7(t)(2)(A).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 78o-7(t)(2)(B).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 78o-7(t)(2)(C).
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led to the 2008 financial crisis in ways that go beyond, or even contradict, the usual SEC solution of mandating more independence for corporate board members. First, the statute and the financial regulators focus
on the ability of directors to assess risk. Although firm stability and the
interests of creditors are not synonymous, this focus on risk may lead
creditor interests to trump shareholder interests in certain situations. Second, in the case of NRSROs, the concept of independence is geared to
directorial responsibility for the quality of a company’s products. Also,
Dodd–Frank suggests a distinction in the shareholder primacy model between Main Street business corporations and financial institutions. Although Dodd–Frank inserted the idea of directors with expertise on
boards of financial institutions, it is uncertain whether the expert director
model will migrate to boards of other kinds of companies.
This Article focuses more on flaws in the independent director
model for financial institutions than for industrial companies primarily
because financial corporations failed so spectacularly in 2008. However,
the failures of Enron and Worldcom, which were not financial institutions, raise the question of whether the independent director model needs
reexamination more generally.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR MODEL
The installation of independent directors on the boards of public
corporations is “grounded in the belief that outside directors are more
effective than inside directors in monitoring management conduct”66 because independent directors’ incentives are more closely aligned with the
goals of shareholders. Therefore, independent directors should maximize
shareholder value by keeping a closer watch on executive management.67
Independent directors are elected by shareholders so they are, in theory,
“not beholden to the CEO.”68 The conventional wisdom is that independent directors will “reduce executive mismanagement, and decrease the
likelihood of future corporate failure.”69
The primary function of the independent director is to monitor the
CEO and other executive officers to ensure that managers do not abuse
their authority by engaging in self-dealing or fraud, or shirk their respon-

66. Thuy-Nga T. Vo, To Be or Not to Be Both CEO and Board Chair, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 65,
70 (2010).
67. Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach to
Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 276 (2012).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 277.
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sibilities.70 Through oversight of management, independent directors are
supposed to “detect and prevent fraud . . . and managerial shirking of
responsibilities.”71 This in turn should “enhance corporate performance
because they can proactively examine corporate affairs, not only to ensure that managers are productive, but also to ensure that managers make
the most efficient and effective decisions.”72
Nevertheless, “companies have continued to fail despite the ubiquity of the majority independent board and related committee structures.”73
Some studies have shown that independent directors actually negatively
affect corporations because they “are more likely to support management
prerogatives than shareholder interests, [because] increasing outsider
representation reduces research and development spending, and [because] an outsider-dominated board is more likely to award ‘golden parachutes’74 to the company’s executives.”75 A 2009 study by David
Erkens et al. points to “the inadequacy of measures to make boards more
accountable to shareholders and to increase the independence of
boards.”76 The study examined 296 financial institutions in thirty different countries that were at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. The results showed that firms with more independent directors on their boards
and a higher level of institutional ownership “experienced worse stock
returns during the crisis period.”77 Professor Edward Rock has suggested
that today’s directors may be too closely aligned with shareholder interests and insufficiently attuned to creditors’ interests.78
Independent directors are part-time participants in a corporation’s
affairs. By definition, they are outsiders. However intelligent, hardworking, or strong minded they may be, they do not have the time or the mandate to challenge management’s judgments except as to a discrete number of issues. If they spend all of their time trying to audit the auditors

70. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 138
(2010).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Sharpe, supra note 67, at 280.
74. “Golden parachutes” are compensation arrangements “that allow covered managers to
voluntarily resign and collect substantial remuneration—in some cases several million dollars—after
a triggering event, usually a hostile takeover.” Philip L. Cochran, Robert A. Wood & Thomas B.
Jones, The Composition of Boards of Directors and Incidence of Golden Parachutes, 28 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 664, 664–65 (1985).
75. Vo, supra note 66, at 70.
76. Allan C. Hutchinson, Hurly-Berle-Corporate Governance, Commercial Profits, and Democratic Deficits, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1219, 1223 (2011).
77. Id.
78. See Rock, supra note 25.
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and assure that executive compensation is reasonable, they will have no
time for focusing on important business and strategy matters. And if they
become essentially full-time directors, they will no longer be independent.
Independent directors are completely beholden to management for
information. This dependence on insiders may give a CEO more power
than was the case when a board included insiders. Moreover, the most
informed outsiders may not be able to sit on a board due to antitrust or
competitive constraints.
If independent directors repeatedly challenge the judgments of a
CEO, the CEO will lose his authority and be forced to resign. Corporations are essentially hierarchical and need a strong leader. The SEC has
not necessarily respected the celebrity CEO, and activist shareholders
today are doing their best to diminish the CEO’s authority.79 Indeed, in
the struggle between management and shareholders, it appears that CEO
power is being diminished.80 But some of the most highly regarded U.S.
corporations have had authoritarian CEOs who have rewarded shareholders over a long period of time.81 This does not mean that independent
directors are a bad idea, but corporations should have greater freedom to
experiment with board structures than they now have in the United States
under federal law. Also, although the board of independent directors has
been advocated in jurisdictions around the world, it might not be appropriate everywhere. Further, because the independent director board simply cannot carry the freight the SEC has placed upon it, it is bound to disappoint, causing investor and public dissatisfaction and loss of confidence.
The collegial board has its flaws and there are times when management deserves to be challenged and even thrown out of office, but the
model of mixed independent and non-independent directors actually
served the U.S. economy well over a long period of time. The consequences of changing this model to one where investors control the public
corporation and a federal government agency controls board structure is
problematic and did not prevent the 2008 financial meltdown.
The tweaking of the independent director model for NRSROs is an
interesting development. In the case of rating agencies, the purpose of
79. See, e.g., Michael J. De La Merced, Dell Buys Time to Seek Support for Sale to its Founder, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, at B2 (detailing the battle between CEO Michael Dell and activist
shareholder Carl Icahn for control of Dell, Inc.).
80. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embatttled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 989 (2010).
81. The corporations run by Warren Buffet (Bershire Hathaway), Jack Welch (General Electric), and Bill Gates (Microsoft) come to mind as examples. See Helen Stock, Buffet Admonishes
Fund Directors, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2004, at A15.
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the independent director no longer seems to be acting on behalf of the
shareholders as a check on management, but rather, is acting to insure the
quality of the corporation’s product ratings. The NRSRO independent
director would appear to be a director who can put a brake on the quest
for corporate profits if necessary to improve ratings quality. This confuses the independent director model and makes one wonder whether the
entire independent director concept needs rethinking.
The SEC does not have general authority to regulate internal corporate affairs.82 Yet, state law does not require particular board structures,
including whether or not any independent directors are required on
boards or particular committees, such as the audit committee. Rather,
state legislators have been silent on this issue so that corporations could
deal with it flexibly and good corporate practices could develop over
time.83 Courts have dealt with issues of board structure and independent
directors in cases enforcing fiduciary duties 84 or in other specific contexts, such as whether demand needs to be made in a derivative case.85
Courts have generally encouraged boards to have independent directors
by more carefully scrutinizing the actions of non-independent directors.86
In some cases, state law has been more flexible than stock exchange definitions of independence, but in other situations state law has held relationships that would not fit within those definitions to demonstrate a lack
of independence. 87 If the SEC prevents the development of state law with
regard to independent directors, state law is likely to atrophy.
IV. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND OTHER MODELS
Shareholder primacy has been the dominant corporate governance
theory since Berle and Dodd first debated it in the 1930s. However, the
theory has recently begun to fall out of favor for several reasons. First,
the theory is premised on the idea of shareholder homogeneity—the ex82. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977).
83. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 5.5
(2002); FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
84. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000); Kahn v. Tremont, 694 A.2d 422 (Del.
1997); Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Cooke v. Oolie, 2000 WL
710199 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000); Chesapeake v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
85. See, e.g., Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1996); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180
(Del. 1988); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984); Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981)
86. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec., 224 N.Y. 483 (N.Y. 1918).
87. E.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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istence of which is becoming increasingly rare. Second, the theory gives
managers a short-term focus, rather than a focus on the long-term development of the corporation, with its emphasis on shareholder value. In
addition, shareholder primacy is thought to have resulted in increased
risk taking by financial corporations, which led to the 2008 financial crisis. Scholars continue to debate whether other theories of corporate governance are better models than the dominant shareholder primacy approach.
A. Shareholder Primacy
The independent director model is intertwined with the shareholder
primacy model. The shareholder primacy theory “derives from the concept that the shareholders are the owners of the corporation and, as such,
are entitled to control it, determine its fundamental policies, and decide
whether to make fundamental shifts in corporate policy and practice.”88
Under this theory, officers and directors are considered agents of the
shareholders.89 They have a duty to maximize the financial value of the
corporation in order to increase the value of the shareholders’ interest.90
Essentially, shareholder primacy means that corporations exist to serve
the economic interests of shareholders. 91
In addition to the ownership rationale that supports the shareholder
primacy theory, proponents also point out that shareholders are the sole
residual claimants of the corporation and, as such, “are in the best position to exercise control for the good of all corporate constituents.”92 Because shareholders are not paid until after all other stakeholders receive
their entitlements, shareholders must “exercise discretion in a way that
maximizes value for the entire corporation.”93
At one time, directors’ fiduciary duties were to the corporation and
the body of shareholders as a whole. Because the SEC views its mandate
as the protection of investors, it has changed this duty (for public compa88. Robert Sprague, Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards for Sustainable Corporate Governance, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 47, 59 (2010) (quoting John H. Matheson & Brent
A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76
MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1327 (1992)).
89. Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 501 (2012).
90. Marshall M. Magaro, Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility
Through the Shareholder-Primacy Norm, 85 IND. L.J. 1149, 1153–54 (2010).
91. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 116 (2012) [hereinafter Bizarre Law and Economics].
92. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn
Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2076 (2013) [hereinafter Shareholder Democracy].
93. Id. at 2083.
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nies) to a direct duty by directors to shareholders. But the SEC’s mantra
that it is the investors’ advocate is too narrow. Since 1996, an amendment to the securities laws requires the SEC to consider efficiency, competition, and capital formation in addition to the protection of investors.94
One problem with the shareholder primacy theory is that it assumes
the existence of “shareholder preference homogeneity”—that all shareholders “have a single-minded interest in wealth maximization.”95 However, in recent years, it has become evident that not all shareholders share
this common goal. Rather, “their interests diverge along a number of dimensions.”96 For example, some shareholders are in the control group
while others are not. Non-employee shareholders often have different
interests than employee and pension-holding shareholders. In addition,
“time horizons” for wealth maximization vary among shareholders. 97
“Short-term and long-term shareholders often have strongly divergent
goals, which is particularly relevant given the increasing role of activist
short-term investors such as hedge funds.”98 And in instances where
shareholder interests are aligned and they can agree on the definition of
wealth maximization, they may still differ as to the best way to achieve
that goal.99
One response to the lack of shareholder homogeneity is to move
away from the shareholder primacy theory and move towards one of the
board primacy theories. Because shareholder preferences are as diverse
as those of the corporation’s other constituents, it is arguable that “corporate boards should be less responsive to shareholder interests[,] and more
power and discretion should be accorded to these boards.”100 However,
while shareholder heterogeneity may provide some support for a board
primacy approach, “it is relevant to almost any feature of corporate gov-

94. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2010); see also id. § 78b(j).
95. Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 92, at 2085.
96. Hayden & Bodie, Bizarre Law and Economics, supra note 91, at 181.
97. Because of computerized trading, investors today can hold stock for only seconds or nanoseconds. While other investors may hold for the long term, at the end of World War II, the average
holding period for stockholders was four years; by 2008 it was two months and by 2011, it was only
twenty-two seconds. Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 700 (2013). While
many pension funds and other investors hold for longer periods of time, the SEC should be considering the impact of today’s trading techniques on its corporate governance theories.
98. Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder–Stakeholder
Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 641, 659 (2011).
99. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder
Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1230–32 (2009).
100. Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 92, at 2096.
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ernance that makes the system more or less responsive to the shareholders.”101
Another criticism of the shareholder primacy theory is that it causes
management to focus too much on short-term goals, like stock price, and
pay less attention to the long-term development of the corporation.102
The 2008 financial crisis “added more fuel to the debate about shareholder empowerment.”103 Although recent legislation and rulemaking by
the SEC has pushed “the trend toward more shareholder influence, we
cannot rule out that the increased shareholder orientation of the past two
decades is partly to blame for the [2008] events, given that pressure to
produce more shareholder value may have led to more risk-taking, particularly in financial institutions.”104
In Hurly-Berle-Corporate Governance, Commercial Profits, and
Democratic Deficits, Allan C. Hutchison argues that there was “a failure
on the part of regulators to appreciate that it was the single-minded focus
on maximizing shareholder value that was at the heart of the [financial
crisis].”105 According to Hutchison, “the corporation’s demise was fueled
by the single-minded and irresponsible efforts by the management and
board to inflate and maintain share prices and stock values.”106 Thus, it
was the “continuing attachment to shareholder primacy [that] was as
much the problem as the solution.”107 While Hutchison does not propose
that any particular theory of corporate governance replace the shareholder primacy norm, he does recommend the creation of a more democratic
corporate governance approach through “limits on limited liability; a
broadening of directors’ fiduciary duties; the increased representativeness of the board; and the enactment of substantive regulatory standards.”108
The impact that financial institutions have on the real economy and
the great recession that followed the 2008 Wall Street collapse should
not be ignored in assessing shareholder primacy. Neither should other
examples of corporate focus on shareholder gain resulting in anti-social
conduct by large corporations. Shareholder primacy often drives public
corporations to act in ways that are contrary to the interests of other constituencies and the public generally. In the United States, the problems
101. Id. at 2097.
102. Gelter, supra note 98, at 659.
103. Id. at 660.
104. Id.
105. See Hutchinson, supra note 76, at 1238.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1250.
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created by operating corporations exclusively for shareholder gain have
been ameliorated by broad regulatory statutes to protect such interests,
e.g., food and drug safety, as well as environmental and employee safety.
But the burden on business of such regulation is great, and it might be
better if director focus on constituencies beyond shareholders could substitute for ever-increasing statutory and agency regulation.
B. Board Primacy and Other Theories
Proponents of the board primacy theory focus on advocating for
greater board independence, rather than “advocating for greater shareholder involvement.”109 According to Grant Hayden and Matthew Bodie,
there are four primary board theories: the director primacy theory, the
team production theory, the self-perpetuating board theory, and the quinquennial election model.110
Under the first theory, director primacy theory of corporate law, directors must manage “the corporation according to their best judgment.”111 According to one proponent of this theory, Stephen M. Bainbridge, “The chief economic virtue of the public corporation is . . . that it
provides a hierarchical decision-making structure well-suited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees,
managers, shareholders, creditors, and other constituencies.”112 Bainbridge and other director primacy advocates believe that this view of director conduct actually supports a “shareholder wealth maximization
norm.”113 This view of director conduct supports a view of directors as
“neutral mediating hierarchs.”114 Under this theory, directors “make sure
that each corporate constituent receives adequate returns in light of their
participation in the corporate endeavor.”115 Thus, “shareholder wealth
maximization is no longer a mandate.”116
According to Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, under the second theory, the team production theory, the corporation is comprised of “a series
of relationships”117 that “result in the joint production of goods or ser109. Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 93, at 2076.
110. Id. at 2089.
111. See Gold, supra note 89, at 501.
112. Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 93, at 2090 (citing Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1754–
57 (2006)).
113. See Gold, supra note 89, at 501.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 93, at 2091.

796

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:775

vices that in turn create wealth.”118 In the context of these relationships,
directors must be insulated and independent because they “serve as the
ultimate authority when it comes to assigning responsibilities, mediating
disputes, and divvying up the profits.”119 If the board were to favor one
group over another, those in the unfavored group “would be less willing
to make the proper investments of capital and labor to make the firm
function.”120 Unlike proponents of the director primacy theory, Blair and
Stout do not argue for shareholder wealth maximization. Instead, they
argue that directors “owe a duty to the corporation and that the corporation consists of all of the stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise.”121
The third theory is the self-perpetuating board theory. This approach, which is chiefly supported by Lawrence Mitchell, argues that
boards of public corporations should be self-perpetual and that the directors themselves should “fill the periodic vacancies resulting from death,
resignation, and increases in board size by selecting the people to fill
those vacancies.”122 Mitchell argues that this admittedly radical approach
“would best free managers to manage the firm.”123 Mitchell advocates
against any control by shareholders because such control causes directors
to only focus on share price. 124 By contrast, granting directors “complete
freedom from shareholder oversight would ‘enable them to manage responsibly and for the long term.’”125
Proponents of the fourth theory, the quinquennial election model of
the corporation, “deplore the short-term focus that shareholder primacy
brings to the corporation,” and instead establish a new framework that
revolves around lengthening the terms of directors to five years. 126 During their five-year terms, directors could only be fired for illegal conduct
or “willful malfeasance.”127 Although directors would have the authority
to approve mergers, acquisitions, and the like, these changes could only
occur “at the time of the directors’ election.”128 In addition, directors
would be required to present a detailed five-year corporate plan that
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2093.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S
NEWEST EXPORT 101 (2001)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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would be critiqued by independent advisors prior to the election. The
director’s compensation would also be directly tied to the success or failure of the plan. 129
In Questioning Authority: The Critical Link Between Board Power
and Process, Professor Nicola Faith Sharpe discusses an additional theory of corporate control—managerialism.130 Under this theory lies the assumption that managers “run the firm free from any significant influence
of the boards.”131 Advocates of this theory place the ultimate right of
corporate control in the hands of managers, not directors or shareholders.”132 While discussions about this approach have diminished in modern corporate governance scholarship, there is practical evidence that the
theory is in use. For example, CEOs have control over the selection of
directors, over the board meeting agendas, and because of information
asymmetry, the CEOs also have control over the amount and nature of
the directors’ knowledge and information about the corporation. 133
C. Stakeholder Theory
Under the stakeholder theory, which is similar to the teamproduction theory, officers and directors’ fiduciary obligations flow not
only to the shareholders of the corporation, but also to “nonshareholder
constituents whose interests are affected by corporate action.”134 “The
heart of stakeholder theory is that corporations affect a variety of individuals and groups who have a ‘stake’ in the firm.”135 Because the corporation “benefits from the fruits of those individuals and groups,” management has a “reciprocal duty to them.”136 Thus, managers have “broader obligations to balance the interests of shareholders with the interests
and concerns of [stakeholders].”137 Stakeholders, unlike shareholders, are
those people with whom corporate “[m]anagers regularly deal with: employees, regarding work performance and working conditions; suppliers,
concerning the quality of the goods delivered and non-delivery of goods;
customers, who complain about the goods that the corporation markets;
129. Id. at 2093–94.
130. Nicola Faith Sharpe, Questioning Authority: The Critical Link Between Board Power and
Process, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (2012).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Marshall M. Magaro, Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility
Through the Shareholder-Primacy Norm, 85 IND. L.J. 1149, 1156 (2010).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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and local communities, concerning what the corporation is doing or not
doing as a corporate citizen.”138 By taking into account all stakeholders’
interests, “managers gain respect and trust in the eyes of stakeholders;
and, importantly for the corporation, they can do their job better and
more efficiently.”139
The stakeholder theory competes with shareholder primacy because
shareholder primacy “pushes managers to exploit non-shareholders in
pursuit of shareholder gains.”140 For example, “directors can put downward pressure on wages and benefits for corporate employees”141 in order
to increase shareholder wealth. In addition, “unlike shareholder primacy,
no grouping has prima facie priority over another, and no group warrants
priority over any other groups.”142
Some commentators have argued that “for a corporation to be truly
sustainable, it will have to adopt a stakeholder, rather than a shareholder,
value approach.”143 Robert Sprague argues that shareholder wealth maximization occurs in the long run when “managers act in the best interests
of those who also have a stake in the success of the corporation—such as
employees, suppliers, customers, and society. If corporate activities promote a healthy society, that society, in return, can support an environment conducive to business growth.”144
The anti-takeover statutes passed by many states in response to the
takeover mania of the 1980s were based on a stakeholder theory. Some
of these statutes allow directors to consider constituencies other than
shareholders when confronted with a hostile takeover. 145 Other statutes
allow such considerations for any and all directorial decisions. 146 These
statutes have been upheld as not preempted by the federal securities laws,
which expressed a principle of neutrality as between bidders and target
companies. Although these other constituency statutes were passed at the
behest of labor interests because of the large-scale firings that generally

138. Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH.
J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 267 (2010).
139. Id.
140. David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2011).
141. Id.
142. See Keay, supra note 138, at 268.
143. Robert Sprague, Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards for Sustainable Corporate Governance, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 47, 78 (2010).
144. Id. at 80–81.
145. See Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973, 2040 tbl.6
(2009) (listing other constituency statutes and effective dates by state).
146. E.g., 15 PENN. CONS. STATS. ANN. §§ 1711, 1715, 1716, 1717, 2502 (West 1990).
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followed takeovers,147 they could be utilized more generally to protect
employee and other interests against shareholder interests. 148
The Stewardship Code149 adopted in the United Kingdom after the
financial crisis may change the shareholder-centric perspective of U.K.
law to a stakeholder perspective, at least for financial institutions. Further, because of the existence of depositor insurance or bailouts by the
state, the government is recognized as a key stakeholder who may be
more concerned about the public interest than shareholder interests. 150
Recently, many states have made provisions for the incorporation
of benefit and flexible purpose corporations, which straddle a space between for-profit and non-profit corporations. The benefit corporation
commits its owners to pursue social or philanthropic objectives, although
shareholder profits may also be pursued. However, there is no obligation
to give shareholders priority. 151 Flexible purpose corporations similarly
would allow customers, the community, or society to trump shareholder
interests.152 These statutes are an updated version of the other constituency statues, and their use is an indication that at least some entrepreneurs
eschew the model of managing a corporation exclusively for shareholder
gain.
D. Bank Boards
After the 2008 financial crisis, regulators in the United States and
Europe gave greater attention to the corporate governance of banks.
Dodd–Frank required large bank holding companies to establish a risk
committee. Similarly, the EU draft Capital Requirements Directive mandates that banks establish a risk committee composed of members of the
management body who do not perform any executive functions at the
bank.153 The management body is defined as the governing body of a

147. Barzuza, supra note 145, at 1989.
148. Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156
(1993).
149. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2012), available at http://www.
frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.a
spx.
150. See Iris H-Y Chin, Institutional Shareholders as Stewards: Toward a New Conception of
Corporate Governance, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 387, 418 (2012).
151. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(d) (West 2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1707(1)–(3)
(McKinney 2011).
152. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602 (West 2011).
153. Jaap W. Winter, The Financial Crisis: Does Good Corporate Governance Matter and
How to Achieve It?, 9 (DSF Policy Paper, No. 14, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972057 .
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corporation, comprising of the supervisory and the managerial functions
with ultimate decision-making authority.154
Under the corporate law of the United States, directors do not generally owe a duty to creditors, with the possible exception of when the
corporation is on the verge of insolvency. 155 This proposition was tested
during the takeover battles of the 1980s and was maintained in several
cases.156 Yet, at one time, bank directors were held to have duties to depositors of the bank, and bank deposits in the United States are insured
by the FDIC.157 Similarly, directors of failed banks were even subject to
some personal liability. 158 The concern after the 2008 financial crisis is,
rightly, to prevent future bank insolvencies. Although risk committees
are one response, explicitly charging directors with a duty to depositors
would be another appropriate response.
As discussed above, Dodd–Frank did effect some changes in the
corporate governance of financial institutions, particularly with regard to
executive compensation. 159 European thinking has progressed further in
this regard to focus on the short-term thinking and behavior of investors
and attempt to impose stewardship duties on investors in financial institutions in order to curb risky managerial behavior. 160 Improved monitoring of corporate governance codes in the public interest is suggested. In
addition, shareholders, as stewards, should be looking at the long-term
viability of the corporation with the interests of the state as a lender of
last resort in mind.161
Most of the corporate governance reforms for bank and public
company boards have focused on director independence, although executive compensation and the establishment of risk committees have received some attention. Nevertheless, the populist response to the 2008
financial crisis has failed to address the role of equity market pressures in

154. Id.
155. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.
2007); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns, Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
156. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
157. Christopher M. Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis Financial
Firms, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 527, 536–41 (2013).
158. Id.
159. See supra Part II.D.
160. Internal Market & Services, Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company
Law, at 46 (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/
reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf.
161. See Chin, supra note 150, at 423, 431–32.
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risk-taking by financial institutions. 162 Indeed, there is some evidence
that shareholders supported higher leverage and risky conduct by banks
in order to generate higher returns.163 Therefore, giving shareholders
more power over bank management does not seem to be a valid solution
to the problems of bank failure. Further, relying on independent directors
to monitor managers with regard to their remuneration is futile if shareholders appoint the members of the compensation committee.164 Therefore, conferring the power to appoint members of the compensation
committee upon debt holders might be a better solution. 165
F. Further Problems When the Government Is a
Shareholder or Stakeholder
In emerging economies, especially the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India,
and China) countries, former state owned enterprises (SOEs) that have
been fully or partially privatized have been listed on national or foreign
stock exchanges and have become subject to independent director requirements. Nevertheless, where the government remains a major stockholder, questions remain as to what independence means and how independent a director can be.
A similar issue has arisen with regard to public companies in which
the U.S. government and European governments took a major stake as a
stockholder, a bondholder, or otherwise during the 2008 financial crisis.
From 2008 to 2009, the U.S. government’s portfolio of securities in private sector companies increased 282% from $340.4 billion to $959.9 billion.166 As of June 1, 2010, the U.S. government held equity positions of
either preferred or common shares in five major corporations (AIG,
Chrysler, Citigroup, GM, and GMAC) and in Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac.167 Similarly, the U.K. government became a major shareholder of
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds Banking Group, amongst oth-

162. Bruner, supra note 157, at 529.
163. Id. at 557.
164. Edyta M. Dorenbos & Alessio M. Pacces, Corporate Governance of Banks: Is More
Board Independence the Solution?, DOVENSCHMIDT Q., May 3, 2013, at 4, available at http://ssrn.co
m/abstract=2260341.
165. Id. at 32.
166. Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public Ownership of
Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127, 1152 (2010).
167. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-719, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, ONGOING CHALLENGES AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES RELATED
TO GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES, 13 (2010) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]. See Steven M. Davidoff, Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the
Midst of the Financial Crisis, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1737–56 (2011).
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er banks.168 These holdings were considered antithetical to Anglo-Saxon
capitalism;169 therefore, it was thought that the government should not
act like an ordinary commercial shareholder, but rather, a reluctant one.
The preference of both the U.S. and U.K. governments was for a short
holding period during which the government should not control day-today management decision making.170
Nevertheless, certain inherent conflicts between the government as
a stockholder, committed to protecting taxpayer interests, and other governmental roles, such as the government as regulator of financial institutions, became apparent. 171 Additionally, there was a conflict between the
goal of stabilizing the financial and housing markets and early divestment. Therefore, gaining concessions from management, labor, and creditors became a priority and exerting control over management also occurred.172 The U.S. government limited executive compensation and dividend payments. 173 The government also mandated the appointment of
new board members and executive officers more directly and more successfully than is generally accomplished by an institutional investor or
private equity fund.174 So, even limited government ownership raises the
question as to what director independence means when the government is
a major investor in a company.
In the context of government ownership, independence should
mean not only independence from the management of the company but
also independence from the majority stockholder. Yet, when the government appoints, or at least approves, the directors, the directors are not
realistically independent of government control.175 As a political actor,
the government is in a position to pick the winners and losers among various corporate and other constituencies. The government may well not
168. Privatising British Banks: Cutting Losses, ECONOMIST, May 11, 2013, at 61. The U.K.
government took an 82% stake in RBS; see also, George Parker, Prospect of Early Sale Looks Less
Likely, FIN. TIMES, June 13, 2013, at 19.
169. See The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, which requires congressional
authorization before the U.S. government can own private sector companies. 31 U.S.C. § 9102
(1982).
170. See GAO Report, supra note 167, at 10.
171. Id. at 55.
172. Id. at 51.
173. Id. at 26.
174. Id at 20–25. Similar government control of management appointment has occurred in the
United Kingdom. See Jonathan Ford, Osborne Shouldn’t Treat RBS Like His Family Business, FIN.
TIMES, June 14, 2013, at 9; Patrick Jenkins, RBS Marriage Counsellor Turns Executioner, FIN.
TIMES, June 14, 2013, at 15.
175. See generally Mariana Pargendler, The Unintended Consequences of State Ownership:
The Brazilian Experience, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917 (2012), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordha
m.edu/flr/vol80/iss6/19/.
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operate private sector companies with a view to maximize wealth, but
rather may be seeking to achieve other goals. These problems and the
doubts they raise about the viability of independent directors are readily
apparent, even in a situation such as the temporary taking of equity positions in banks and other companies during the 2008 financial crisis. The
issue of how independent directors can be independent becomes even
more interesting in the case of long-term government holdings in partially privatized companies in other countries.
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
A. Europe
Europe has employed different corporate governance models. For
example, Germany has two-tier boards, with employee representation on
the second tier. Conversely, the United Kingdom has boards of directors
and directorial fiduciary duties similar to the United States. The U.K.
Cadbury Code of 1992, however, led to a split between the executive and
non-executive directors. Since the non-executive directors, in theory,
supervise the executive directors, the requirements for non-executive
directors serve to harmonize the one-tier and two-tier board structures.176
Independence of directors at the board level became a paradigm in Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century and was included as a
recommendation in the Action Plan of the European Commission in
2003.177 In particular, the codes recommended a majority of independent
directors for the audit, nominating, and compensation committees. 178
In the United Kingdom, independence standards are contained in
the Corporate Governance Code of 2010 and prior codes. Independence
is not affirmatively defined and is determined by the board. 179 The use of
codes to encourage independent board members was endorsed by the
European Commission in 2005.180 Accordingly, the issue of having a
substantial number, and often a majority, of independent directors is gen-

176. Patrick C. Leyens, Corporate Governance in Europe: Foundations, Developments and
Perspectives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 183–98
(2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2176987.
177. Id. at 6.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Comm’n of Eur. Communities, Recommendation on the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the (Supervisory) Board, 2005 O.J.
(L 52) 51, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:052:005
1:0063:EN:PDF.
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erally covered by “comply or explain” corporate governance codes.181
There are few mandatory requirements, although under an EU directive,
at least one member of the audit committee must be independent. 182
In Germany, supervisory board members are non-executive by definition, but they are not necessarily independent. 183 An important issue is
the definition of independence. An EU Green Paper defines independent
as “free of any business, family or other relationship, with the company,
its controlling shareholder or the management of either, that creates a
conflict of interest such as to impair his judgment.”184 The question of
whether a representative of a controlling shareholder is independent is
important in Europe and other countries, but it has not been a focus in the
United States. In several European countries a representative of a 10%
shareholder is not considered independent.185
In Europe, the financial crisis has led to a skeptical view of the value of director independence as opposed to other qualities a director
should have. This view is more pervasive than it has been in the United
States and is especially pronounced in regard to the boards of financial
institutions. According to an EU Green Paper, the non-executive directors of financial institutions did not devote sufficient resources or time to
their duties; did not come from sufficiently diverse backgrounds; did not
carry out a serious appraisal of their performance; and were unable or
unwilling to ensure that the risk management of their companies was appropriate.186
Because shortcomings in corporate governance led to some of the
problems at financial institutions during the crisis, debates in Europe
have moved away from independent directors and have turned to other
criteria for boards. One problem with the independent director model is a
downplaying of competence. Recent debates in Europe about board
composition focus on expertise and diversity as much as independ-

181. Eur. Comm’n, Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law, at 41
(Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflection
group_report_ en.pdf.
182. Directive 2006/43/EC of 17 May 2006, (EC) No. 157/87, art. 41.1.
183. Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Boards in Europe—Accountability and Convergence 16
(ECGI Law Working Paper, No. 205, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212272. In the
Italian two-tier model, if the management board has more than four members, at least one should be
independent.
184. Comm’n of Eur. Communities, supra note 181, at 13.1.1(d).
185. Davies & Hopt, supra note 183, at 17–18.
186. Eur. Comm’n, Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies, at 6, COM (2010) 285 final (June 2, 2010).
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ence.187 Especially for financial firms, there is a need for expertise so the
board can effectively discharge its responsibilities.188
The most recent European Commission Action Plan on corporate
governance of listed companies has recommended enhanced transparency, shareholder engagement, and company growth and competitiveness.189 Director independence is ignored or, at best, subsumed under a
concern about conflict-of-interest transactions. Improved implementation
of the “comply or explain” policy of the corporate governance codes is
recommended, which could strengthen the independence of directors. 190
Yet, the first item discussed in the Action Plan with regard to transparency is disclosure of board diversity policy and management of nonfinancial risks.191 Although diversity is advocated in order to limit groupthink and challenge management, it is also related to the Commission
proposal on improving gender balance on boards. 192 The debates about
diversity are a push for more women on corporate boards in Europe. In
some countries, such diversity has been mandated, but other countries
have rejected required diversity. 193
The financial crisis of 2008, the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in
Europe, and the LIBOR scandal may serve to orient boards and regulators in the direction of demanding more director competence, especially
with regard to risk identification and management. These new desired
attributes for board members in Europe—expertise and diversity—are
likely to reduce independence as a priority. Furthermore, independence
may actually contribute to the lack of meaningful involvement by nonexecutive directors. Accordingly, insider knowledge and experience may
be required for effective board participation in the decision making of
firms, especially financial firms.194
B. China
In China, the opening of the capital markets to foreign investment
has not led to a full implementation of corporate governance principles,
nor has it led to shareholder primacy. Nevertheless, securities regulators
in China and Hong Kong have implemented formal requirements for di187. Davies & Hopt, supra note 183, at 22.
188. See id. at 23.
189. Eur. Comm’n, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance, COM
(2012) 740 final (Dec. 12, 2012).
190. Id. at 7.
191. Id. at 4–5.
192. Id. at 6.
193. Davies & Hopt, supra note 183, at 23–25.
194. See Winter, supra note 153, at 7.
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rector independence. As will be discussed below, two elements intrinsic
to the formation of capital within China have prevented shareholder primacy from taking root: extensive government involvement and relationbased governance. Both elements are interrelated and work together to
trump shareholder primacy as a focus of Chinese corporate directors.
The Company Law of China was passed in the 1990s and adopted a
two-tiered board structure, similar to the German corporate governance
model, with a board of directors and a board of supervisors. Employee
representatives may sit on both boards.195 As the capital markets grew,
the regulatory framework expanded to encourage capital formation and
the privatization of traditional state-owned enterprises into joint stock
companies.196 The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies
in China and the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China were
passed to regulate the corporate governance of the newly minted corporate entities. The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies
maintains multiple provisions regarding directors and their independence, including rules for related party transactions and independent directors.197 In addition, various financial regulators, including the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and the exchanges regulate
these public companies. 198
The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China
requires listed companies to be operated “in an independent manner”
with directors “independent from the listed company that employs them
and the company’s major shareholders.”199 Further, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies encourages directors to “diligently perform their duties for the best interests of the company and all the
shareholders.”200 The exchanges, in an attempt to promote international
investment, have adopted even more stringent requirements for inde195. Companies Law of the PRC (中华人民共和国公司法, 2005) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s Cong. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 45, 52,
109, 118 (China), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/statelaws/200904/t20
090428_102712.htm.
196. See Donald Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 125, 131 (2006) (noting the high percentage of listed companies being former state
owned enterprises).
197. Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (issued by the Chinese
Securities Regulatory Commission, effective Jan. 7, 2007), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/
csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.htm.
198. See, e.g., GEM Listing Rules, HONG KONG EXH., at 5.05, http://www.hkex.com.hk/
eng/rulesreg/listrules/gemrules/documents/chapter_5.pdf [hereinafter HKEx, GEM Listing Rules].
199. Kan Zhang, Corporate Governance in China: How Does the State Influence Its Own
Enterprises?, 9 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 111, 115 (2013); see also Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 197, at ch. 2(3), ch. 3(5).
200. See Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 197, at ch. 3(2).

2014]

Is the Independent Director Model Broken?

807

pendent directors. For example, the Hong Kong exchange (HKEx) requires that an issuer have at least three independent directors, which must
comprise one-third of the board members.201 Independence is further defined as owning less than 1% of the shares, although exchange approval
can occur for those owning less than 5%; not having worked as a principal or partner for an advisor to the issuer or controlling shareholder within one year of becoming a director; not having a material interest in the
activities of the corporation; and not being a direct relative (child, sibling, or parent) of a chief executive or substantial shareholder. 202 These
requirements, while better than none, are insufficient to prevent the exploitation of minority shareholders by the countervailing forces of government prerogatives and related party transactions.
Chinese companies maintain an obligation to consider the general
welfare of the PRC203 and not only the welfare of minority or public
shareholders; therefore, independence does not have the same meaning
as in the United States.204 Independence of directors in Chinese companies does not equate to independence from government interference of
corporate governance. Chinese corporations have a general mandate to
take state priorities into account for their operations. Moreover, the state
is a controlling shareholder in a large majority of listed Chinese companies.205 As a result, Chinese companies and state owned enterprises have
similar social responsibilities and are viewed as vehicles for state control
over certain industries, rather than drivers of capital markets deriving
profits for their shareholders.
While advocating for increased shareholder returns in a 2012 interview, former CSRC Commissioner Guo Shuqing acknowledged Chinese
corporate directors’ low priority for investor returns among other competing interests.206 Despite pressure for independence from the govern201. HKEx, GEM Listing Rules, supra note 198, at 5.05A
202. HKEx, GEM Listing Rules, supra note 198, at 5.09.
203. Companies Law, supra note 195, at Art. 14 (“A company must . . . strengthen the construction of socialist culture and ideology and accept supervision of the government and the public.”).
204. See generally, Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper,
No. 409, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1952623; see also, Companies Law, supra note
195, at art. 57 (restricting those deemed “without capacity or with restricted capacity for civil acts”
from acting as directors).
205. See Clarke, supra note 196, at 139; Andrei Molchynsky, ‘Seize and Hold With Both
Hands’: The Political Implications of Corporate and Securities Law Reforms Under Hu Jintao 139
(Nov. 2012), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2257263.
206. Interview by Gong Wen and Xu Zhifeng with Guo Shuqing, Chairman, China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n (Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/Informations/
phgall/201208/t20120809_213655.htm.
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ment in the capital markets, directors are unlikely to promote shareholder
gain over state prerogatives. The continued divergence from the traditional Western corporate objective of shareholder gain stems from the
directors of Chinese corporations frequently being bureaucrats and politicians that view their fiduciary duty as being towards the state instead of
the company’s shareholders. 207 With that viewpoint, directors have limited incentive to maximize profit potential, as there is limited political
payout for modestly increasing a company’s profits.208 Instead, the directors represent the state’s interests in a variety of ways, including maintaining depressed prices for essential products, enforcing state birth control policies among employees, and pursuing an urban full-employment
policy.209 Furthermore, where politically connected chief executives are
concerned, the board of directors face increased challenges in monitoring
and disciplining the management of the company. 210
In addition to state owned or dominated enterprises, non-state
owned companies exist in China and Hong Kong. Many are controlled
by family members or small groups that in turn control large segments of
the Chinese economy. 211 The controlling family members and their representatives on boards of directors negatively impact the minority shareholders through increased agency costs. 212 Majority stakeholders are
rarely encumbered by corporate governance structures and are able to
place directors on the board of the company.213 In order to get around the
independence requirements, such as those of the HKEx, family conglomerates use non-relative family representatives, entrusted to represent the
family’s interests, to promote their interests on the board of directors

207. See Clarke, supra note 196, at 198; see also Nancy Huyghebaert & Lihong Wang, Expropriation of Minority Investors in Chinese Listed Firms: The Role of Internal and External Corporate
Governance Mechanisms, 20 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 328, 329 (2012).
208. See Wei Shen & Chen Lin, Firm Profitability, State Ownership, and Top Management
Turnover at the Listed Firms in China: A Behavioral Perspective, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L
REV. 443, 444 (2009).
209. See Clarke, supra note 196, at 140–41.
210. See Jiaxing You & Guqian Du, Are Political Connections a Blessing or a Curse? Evidence from CEO Turnover in China, 20 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 179, 180 (2012).
211. See Shaomin Li, China’s (Painful) Transition from Relation-Based to Rule-Based Governance: When and How, Not If and Why, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV 567, 575 (2013)
(discussing the “princelings” of China). Relation-based governance is common in emerging economies particularly from Confucian-based culture where family is of particular importance. As the
economies grow, the model becomes untenable as globalization trends persist, and Li posits that
China will soon forego the model in favor of a more efficient rule-based system.
212. See En-Te Chin, Stephen Gray & John Nowland, Family Representatives in Family
Firms, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 243, 260 (2013).
213. See Clarke, supra note 196, at 170–71.
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above those of minority shareholders. 214 The control of these shareholders is exacerbated by the low presence of institutional shareholders with
sufficient shares to place members on the boards of directors to challenge
self-dealing transactions. 215 Even with an increased size of board of directors, an increase in the number of independent directors, or both, no
impact is made on the occurrence of related party transactions. 216 Only
the increase in control rights held by the second to tenth largest investors
acts as an offset to related party transactions. 217
The primacy of the state over shareholders and the low presence of
institutional investors allow continued related party transactions to divert
funds from the companies’ shareholders. Independent directors are
deemed ineffective in preventing either problem because directors maintain a loyalty to the state above the shareholder. Further, if the state is not
the majority shareholder, the director is in place due to another large
stakeholder. Either way, the independent directors are ineffective at representing any interests but those of the largest stakeholders.
Despite the weakness of Chinese corporate law in protecting minority shareholders, the CSRC has made significant strides in altering corporate governance for listed companies with regard to the independence of
directors and other shareholder protection devices. The CSRC had injected corporate fiduciary duties into Chinese law for controlling shareholders, which may be a state or party organ. 218 Further, the provisions with
regard to independent directors came from the CSRC. 219 How the Chinese independent director will develop remains to be seen, but independence does not have the same meaning as it does in the United States or
Europe.
VI. CONCLUSION
The independent director model advocated by the SEC has been accepted in many jurisdictions, either as a mandatory requirement for public companies or a recommended structure. Yet, boards of independent
214. See Chin, Gray & Nowland, supra note 212, at 243.
215. See Interview of Guo Shuqing, supra note 206 (noting China’s low institutional ownership accounting for 15.6% of market capitalization in comparison with the average developed capital
market having institutional ownership representing 70% of market capitalization).
216. See Huyghebaert & Wang, supra note 207, at 329.
217. Id.
218. Nicholas Calcina Howson, “Quack Corporate Governance” As Traditional Chinese Medicine—The Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China’s Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s
Battle Against State Political Economic Power, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 667, 679–680 (2014).
219. Id. at 683.
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directors did not prevent the scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other
companies in the United States and in Europe after the bursting of the
technology bubble of the 1990s. Such boards also failed to prevent the
financial institution meltdowns of 2008. Thus, a rethinking of this model
is necessary.
Although inside or executive directors may have conflicts of interest, they are more knowledgeable than outsiders and more involved in
making business decisions for the corporation, both short-term and longterm. Their most serious conflicts-of-interest decisions relate to compensation, but where directors and officers are both compensated, in whole
or in part, on the basis of contingent stock awards, insiders and outsiders
have similar conflicts. Further, such compensation has resulted in shareholder primacy run amuck. It also encouraged the risk taking that resulted in the 2008 financial crisis. Accordingly, shareholder primacy also
needs to be reexamined.
Since 2008, director diligence and expertise have been areas of focus, but a board of independent directors remains dependent on a corporation’s management for information. Regulation cannot compel those
personal qualities that make a director excellent—intelligence, integrity,
experience, competence, and a willingness to question herd decision
making. Also, a public corporation should not be a battleground where
executives, directors, and shareholders are adversaries. Neither should
the board of directors become a super-compliance committee, more concerned about government regulations than a corporation’s operations and
strategy.
Public corporations should have a mix of independent and nonindependent directors with directors having a duty to the corporation as a
whole. The interests of employees, customers, and creditors should be
balanced against a duty to shareholders, especially when those shareholder interests are short-term. Although such complicated duties may
prove more difficult to enforce than a simple duty to obtain economic
gain for shareholders, shareholder primacy has brought business to a sorry pass, especially in the United States where our industrial base has
been seriously impaired and speculation in the financial markets has
wreaked havoc on the real economy. Only an experienced, competent,
and fully informed board can possibly help to steer a forward course for
public corporations in our complex global economy. The board needs to
be informed by expert and responsible insiders (including service providers to the firm such as commercial bankers, lawyers, and retired company officers) with a stake in the future of the corporation, as well as independent outsiders who have the expertise and ability to both question,
challenge, and advise management.
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In the United States and elsewhere, “independence” now carries a
statutory or stock exchange definition that has frequently led to the selection of former government officials, other famous personalities, educators, and CEOs from other companies who meet the definition of independence but who are not sufficiently expert or diverse to assist in the
creation of overall firm value. The qualities that make a director truly
independent do not come from a statutory definition but rather come
from intelligence, experience, and a strong sense of ethical responsibility.
The ability to challenge the conventional wisdom, to tell truth to power,
is rare, and even rarer is the director who can do so but not destroy the
collegiality of the boardroom. Yet, seeking such individuals should be
the object of director selection.

